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The Global Positioning System and Military Jamming: The
geographies of electronic warfare
Abstract
GPS supports infrastructure assets that are essential to the functioning of national and
international banking operations, power grid, transportation, and communication systems,
therefore its reliability and accuracy is critical. GPS boosts productivity around the world
and has radically changed military operations. Despite the importance of GPS, the relative
weakness of GPS signals are vulnerable to interference. This weakness provides a range of
opportunities for criminals, terrorists and state actors using GPS jamming devices.
Different types of jammers can cause varying degrees of interference, but the use of
powerful military jammers are becoming more prevalent. This article provides an overview
of the emergence, development, and scale of the GPS jamming phenomena. It argues,
overall, that the use of jamming technologies creates new geographies of conflict when we
think about the location and proximity of critical infrastructure. It identifies themes related
to the impact of jamming to better understand present and possible geographical and
geopolitical implications. It concludes that as GPS jamming is not confined to conflict
zones. Interference is possible in a variety of geographical areas.
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Introduction
The Global Positioning System (GPS) “is a satellite-based navigation system
comprised of a network of orbiting satellites that provide location and time
information, anywhere on or near the Earth.”1 First launched in the 1980s, GPS
satellites became fully operational in 1993, and were available for civilian use in
1995. These satellites were first used by the United States military for providing
precision navigation and timing. Over recent decades, free-to-use GPS has
improved considerably in accuracy and reliability, and now it is difficult to find
any civilian or military infrastructure that is not in some way dependent on it.
Not only is GPS used to aid navigation in vehicles, it supports critical
infrastructure by synchronizing a wide range of computer-based systems,
including for law enforcement, emergency services, transportation,
communications, electrical power grids, and financial transactions, amongst
many others. It boosts productivity in many sectors, enabling precision
timing for synchronization, algorithmic decision-making, and operational
efficiency.2 For all these reasons, it is important that GPS data is available
and reliable.3

What is Jamming and Spoofing?
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has called the GPS “a single point of
failure for critical infrastructure.”4 This is, in part, due to the fact that the vast
majority of GPS receivers need to be very sensitive because of the weak signals
coming from distant, orbiting satellites. This weakness creates many
opportunities for criminals as well as state actors seeking military strategic gains.
Jamming is caused by “the transmission of a noise signal across one or more of
the GPS frequencies to raise the noise level or overload the receiver circuitry and
cause a loss of lock.”5 Jammers vary in power and capability, and these are
factors that play into end-user intentions. As this article highlights, jamming is
used to block GPS-enabled tracking. It can also be used for harassment, or to
disorientate navigation and positioning information. Jamming is often
indiscriminate and causes both intentional and unintentional disruption that
transcends borders and penetrates walls and systems.
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There are various methods and intentions for interfering with GPS information.
Spoofing ‘is the act of producing a falsiﬁed version of the GPS signal with the goal
of taking control of a target.6 It could also include introducing a false time signal
into electrical control systems and causing equipment malfunction and damage.7
Counter-jamming technologies, usually built into systems and structures, are
designed to identify when jamming occurs, identify the locations of jamming,
trigger backup systems, or simply ignore or overcome interference. It is not
within the scope of this article to explore counter-jamming technologies,
however.
Interference of the GPS system is therefore an issue that is of concern to a range
of actors, including the military, critical infrastructure owners, and aerial,
maritime and road transport sectors, with potential economic and political
consequences, and threat to life. It is a matter of importance not only in terms of
international relations, but for national security.
Ever since the implications of GPS interference became clear, academic studies
have largely focussed on technical and situational aspects of jamming and
counter-jamming technologies. These studies have focussed on the outcomes of
specific methods which have been undertaken under careful testing conditions.
Technical studies have provided valuable information for the
practitioner/military community, especially in respect to risk and vulnerability
assessments. There has also been interest in how technological changes have
shaped the development of critical infrastructures and influenced their
vulnerability over time.8 Whilst some organizations such as the Resilient
Navigation and Timing Foundation, C4ADS and members have explored various
dimensions of GPS interference, a prime focus on its wider geographical and
geopolitical implications requires more dedicated attention. There is an
opportunity here to explore the geopolitical context of jamming to identify
future challenges.
The aim of this article is to (1) identify the specific contexts jamming is typically
used; (2) to identify the outcomes of the jammings, and; (3) based on these
examples, it seeks to better comprehend the geographical and geopolitical
implications based on likely users, their intentions, and the known ranges of
jammers. It considers the proliferation of more oft-used low-power jamming
devices and the use of high-powered military jammers (Table. 1).
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Table 1. Likely Users and Distances of GPS Jammers
Likely End-users
Privacy seekers;
criminals
Organised
criminals;
terrorists; state
proxy actors;
state/private
security actors
State-assisted
terrorist groups;
militaries

Power

Approximate
Distance

1 deciwatt

Few meters to 9.3 miles

1 kilowatt

31 miles

10 kilowatts

94 miles - 124 miles

Notes: Collected from open-access sources.9

The thesis of this article is based on the premise that, through time, the changing
nature of war and military technology will consistently affect the “spatial
organisation of nations and their resources.”10 It is argued here that end-user
intentions accordant with current jamming distances means that the risk and
vulnerability of assets, in relation to their proximity to those end-users, can be
better comprehended. But this is complicated by the fact that small jamming
devices are easily available and powerful jammers can be homemade or smuggled
into territories as parts and components and then reassembled, or even projected
from aircraft or via ships.
The article first locates the jamming phenomena from a historical perspective in
order to build a contextual understanding of its contemporary implications.
Drawing on examples, it also seeks to identify the likely end-users and their
intentions based on the outcomes of their activities, whether intentional or
unintentional. Finally, it explores future geopolitical challenges in relation to the
examples explored, based on likely end-users and the locations of critical
infrastructure that have been previously affected. The article concludes that as
GPS jamming is not confined to conflict zones, interference is possible in a
variety of geographical areas.
The findings were achieved by extensive literature review of online and offline
media and governmental material. It is important to note that there is a bias
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with the material in this article, which relies almost entirely on English language
and Western-sourced material.

Historical to Contemporary Context of the Effectiveness of Jamming
Brief History of Radio Jamming
The discovery and use of radio waves as a form of communication can be traced
back to the late 19th century. The first recorded instance of intentional radio
jamming (which was, interestingly, for commercial rather than military gains)
was in 1901 during a yacht race in the USA.11 During World War I, radio was used
primarily for military and maritime communications, but became increasingly
used for propaganda purposes.12 It was not until the 1920s when radio was
capable of distributing mass media to millions of listeners.13
During the war and interwar periods of the 20th century, radio transmissions
enabled governments and movements to transmit prohibited information and
ideas over national borders.14 Government and military efforts to disrupt these
transmissions evolved over time, progressively overcoming technical, financial
and geographical hurdles. During the Cold War, for example, the Polish
Communist regime undertook a relentless 39-year campaign of jamming
transmissions from Radio Free Europe, placing transmitters on police stations
and military bases. Such attempts replicated other jamming campaigns by other
communist regimes and colonial Western powers.15 Jamming, though limited in
radius and only effective in certain frequencies, was a large part of controlling the
movement of information for political and military reasons. Radio broadcasting
for propaganda purposes and jamming continues in disputed territories to this
day.
Effectiveness of Jamming Smart Weapons
The launching of communication satellites, the expanded use of radio waves, and
resultant technologies has increased the opportunities for, and the implications
of, jamming. A probable catalyst for new jamming developments came as a result
of the instigation of GPS in the 1970s and the miniaturization of GPS receivers in
the 1980s. Applying GPS guidance to munitions allows the U.S. to develop
steerable smart weapons. These weapons were more precise resulting in greater
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efficiency and less collateral damage in military operations.
During the first Gulf War, many states recognized the importance and
versatility of GPS in modern warfare (beyond its utility in smart weapons), and
in later years the potential of GPS jammers was becoming more marketable.
High-power military jammers were being openly marketed at various defense
fairs by America’s traditional adversaries.16 During the second Gulf War, Iraqi
forces placed Russian-sourced jamming devices on buildings on or near
important strategic targets.17 These jammers were intended to confuse cruise
missile guidance systems, such as Boeing JDAM (Joint Direct Attack
Munition), and Raytheon's BGM-109 Tomahawk land attack cruise missile and
Enhanced Paveway.
There have been mixed messages with regards to the effectiveness of Iraq’s
jamming. The UK and US forces argued that the jammers proved ineffective.18
In the short term, however, it prompted coalition forces to target the jammers
with force and place more reliance on their laser-guided capabilities.19
In the long term, more investment went into anti-spoofing and anti-jamming
capabilities in JDAM kits (even as recently as 2011, there had been speculation
that North Korea were able to affect South Korea’s JDAM arsenal with military
jammers), as well as guided weapons specifically developed to locate and
target jamming locations.20 Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Defense
sought more significant investment into counter-space capabilities as a
consequence of Iraq’s jammings.21 Indeed, the method of placing jammers on
key infrastructures remains a contemporary mode of defense. Russia’s defense
initiative Pole-21, for example, involves placing jammers on key domestic
infrastructures as a precaution for possible conventional war.22 Therefore,
whilst the effectiveness of jamming smart weapons is not entirely clear from
open-access sources, it certainly affected military strategy and had a political
and financial impact in years that followed. For military strategists, precision
bombings are simply more likely to be successful in locations where jammers
are not situated, hence the geographical and geopolitical factors are influenced
by strategic alliances, defense acquisitions, end-user intentions, and owners of
jammers.
Military Jamming and Spoofing Civil and Military Aviation and Shipping
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Apart from potentially disorienting smart weapons, jamming has been used to
make surveillance and targeting methods more difficult. GPS jamming, for
example, was used thwart the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine in
2018. The Mission reported severe jamming of its long-range UAV, which was
observing compliance with the latest ceasefire agreed by fighting parties. The
jamming “caused most of the control and communication links (including
backup systems) between the Ground Control Station and the UAV to fail.”23
In 2016, the Mission had lost a long-range UAV in the same area, over Korsun.
Like in smart weapons, the miniaturization of lightweight antenna systems is
useful for UAVs with low payload capacities. As well as affecting communication
links, spoofing can impact their coordinates. In 2011, Iran spoofed and captured a
U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel UAV by redirecting it to land inside Iranian borders.24
Adding to the embarrassment of the Obama administration, Iran subsequently
accused the U.S. of spying within Iranian airspace and have reportedly attempted
to reverse-engineer the design of the UAV.
China has reportedly used GPS jamming against its neighbors and against U.S.
forces in the Asia-Pacific region, in light of contentious issues over the its
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Amongst other coordinated cyberattacks, there were also reports that China “attempted to interfere with U.S.
military drones at least once in recent years…conducting surveillance missions in
the Spratly Islands.”25
In the ongoing civil war in Syria, where jamming is commonplace, U.S.
surveillance UAVs and AC-130 gunships have been affected by jamming and
spoofing.26 Whilst it has not been disclosed how the gunships have been affected,
it was stressed that the jamming of communication systems and data links
between AC-130 crews, special forces and supporting conventional forces could
affect the process of establishing the location and positive identification of
targets. Even with electro-optically or infrared-enhanced visual aids, jamming
GPS location information can make it harder for AC-130 crews to differentiate
between friendly/hostile forces and civilians, especially in close combat
situations.27
In the same region, Pyongyang has targeted military and civil air and naval
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traffic near the demilitarized zone with Russian-designed military jammers on
more than 100 occasions. This jamming reportedly affected over 1000 civilian
aircraft (as well as South Korean military aircraft), hundreds of fishing vessels,
cell phone services, and car navigation systems, targeting infrastructure
separately and systematically.28
What is unique about North Korea’s military jamming is that it is done with full
knowledge of the consequences to civilian operations, and therefore intended for
harassment and possible economic damage. Indeed, in 2012, one jamming
campaign aimed at the South Korean capital lasted more than two weeks.29 This
length of time is unparalleled elsewhere in civilian areas.
A similar theme is identified in Europe. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs confronted Russian authorities over concerns that civilian aviation and
communications systems had been repeatedly ‘jammed in connection with
nearby Russian military activities’ near Norway’s Eastern Finnmark region.30 On
one occasion, in September 2017, airliners SAS and Widerøe ‘had to navigate
with the help of radio signals due to loss of GPS when they entered the East
Finnmark airspace.’31 Similar instances have occurred in other European
countries bordering Russia.

Impacts and Potential Repercussions
Based on the above examples, military GPS jamming is used as a combined
attrition of an enemy’s communications, target accuracy, surveillance
capabilities, and navigational reliability. GPS jamming can significantly affect the
efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and impact morale. It is also used
offensively and politically for harassment and intimidation in disputed territories
or near military training exercises. The impact of jamming and spoofing have
different consequences, but the potential impacts and repercussions are here
discussed in more detail.
In both the South Korea and Norway examples, whilst it was speculated that
South Korea’s JDAM capabilities were affected, the aircraft and ships in both
countries were able to switch to their backup inertial navigation systems (INS)
and other ground-based systems. In Seoul, much of the jamming signals were
blocked by buildings and hills, and generally caused more of a ‘nuisance more
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than a threat.’32 In Norway, there were no reports of widespread problems in
urban centres.
Nevertheless, whilst the impacts have been reported as relatively negligible, the
consequences of jamming in metropolitan areas could be much more serious if
the jamming persists over a number of days. North Korea’s lengthy 2012
jamming campaign extended the period of inconvenience for civil users,
magnifying the frustration of the population and therefore placing more pressure
on the South to take action. Instead of taking military action (of which the
outcome would be catastrophic), the South protested to the United Nations.
It can be assumed that Russia, North Korea, and China jam neighbouring
countries knowing that lethal retaliation is extremely unlikely, making jamming a
low-risk, high-reward option if provocation is the intention. Intentional jamming
of civilian areas has so far not led to any significant issues beyond scoring
relatively obscure political gains. But there is the potential for the escalation of
conflict and of causing serious vehicle accidents.
On this point, one of the most concerning issues relating to jamming or spoofing
aircraft or ships are in cases where users are not aware that they are receiving
inaccurate navigation and location data. Reports of jamming in the Black Sea,
which affected the situational awareness of some 20 ships (reporting that the
location of the vessels were 20 miles inland), would present obvious inaccuracies
that could be quickly rectified.33 In situations where momentary disorientation is
caused, this could prove catastrophic. Indiscriminate jammings of ships in the
Korean Peninsula was largely negligible as ships had alternative navigation
systems and methods. But momentary and targeted GPS jamming can affect
systems such as automatic identification systems (AIS) which normally use GPS
receivers. Research by the University of Nottingham and the Royal Norwegian
Naval Academy confirmed that jammers could momentarily affect the positioning
data of ships of up to 10 meters which, they stressed, could be very hazardous in
narrow, busy straits.34 Validating these tests, in one real-world example,
momentary GPS interference was considered a likely cause of two large ships
colliding in Germany's busy Kiel Firth waterway.35
In the case of Iran’s spoofing of the US UAV, the act of misdirecting aircraft or
ships into unauthorized airspaces and territories adds weight to the concern that
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spoofing or momentary disorientation of positioning data could escalate tensions
much more than practice of indiscriminately jamming of civilian areas, ships and
aircraft. Indeed, former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney stated that he supported
the option of targeting the captured UAV in Iran immediately with airstrikes
(former President Barack Obama decided instead to request the return of the
UAV).36 It is highly unlikely that Iran’s intentions was to provoke the U.S. into an
armed response, but the outcome of their actions could have had major
consequences.
It is a dark irony that Russia’s downing of the Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983
after it accidentally flew into its territory led to Ronald Reagan’s executive order
allowing civilian access to GPS. But it is a reminder that loss of location could be
exploited by a range of actors with malign intentions, and that reliance on GPS is
not an answer but rather a useful but fragile invention that is exploitable.

The Use and Impact of Small Jamming Devices
There are rising concerns about the widespread acquisition and use of small
pocket-sized ‘privacy seeking’ jamming devices, as well as the potential of homemade jamming devices. Privacy seeking jammers are typically used by drivers in
the freight industry to stop their managers tracking their location, and can be
bought for less than $100 online. These small jamming devices cover a jamming
distance of a few meters to as far as 9 miles.37 They are significantly more difficult
to detect and locate than powerful military devices.
Whilst more “determined” groups, such as organized criminal gangs and
terrorists, may have the means to produce and acquire more powerful jamming
devices than those used by privacy seekers, it is still argued by some critics that it
would take significant mastery of GPS technology to bring “apocalyptic visions of
a cyber-hell” to life, as argued by cyber specialist Martyn Thomas.38 However, the
widespread use of jamming devices that are intended for privacy indiscriminately
and unintentionally affect other services that rely on GPS.
Unintentional jamming with low-power devices has disrupted air travel and
financial transactions on frequent occasions in the U.K. and the United States.
For example, the London Stock Exchange, which relies on precision timing for
financial transactions, has been subject to repeated GPS outages, and many users
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have not been identified or prosecuted.39 In July 27, 2013, it was recorded that
time stamps on the financial trade in the London Stock Exchange were affected
and navigation systems in cars ‘stopped working.’ It was determined that the
offender was a delivery driver hiding from his management.40
Such events have arguably opened Pandora’s box in terms of potentially inviting
criminals and state actors to exploit this weakness, recognizing not only that time
manipulation can disrupt a nation’s economy (by scaring away market
participants or putting domestic traders at significant disadvantages), but this
can be achieved with small devices without being quickly detected. Indeed, it has
been argued by one specialist that spoofing could create ‘opportunities for illgotten gains and disruptions like the 2010 ‘flash crash.’41
It is also feared that these deliberate disruptions could be combined with other
types of electronic and cyber-attacks.42 For example, if jamming alone is
undertaken by numerous individuals in one urban location, the time it would
take to locate and stop them could be considerable. Likewise, there have been
many raised concerns about how devices—whether single powerful device or
multiple devices used systematically—could cause a serious shipping accident
in areas like the English Channel, the world’s busiest seaway.43
Theoretically, in the event of conflict between two or more adversaries, the
combined use of military and low-power ‘civilian’ devices could cause significant
disruption. China—a country where small jamming devices are mass-produced—
has the industrial-base to produce and distribute high quantities of such devices.
Socio-technical changes may also increase the incentive to buy jamming devices
by civilian users; for example, GPS-enabled tracking, toll collection (notably in
Germany), and even gaming trends (Pokémon Go), has seen increased use of
small jamming devices.
Geographies of Jamming
Unlike cyber-crime which has no limitations in terms of ranges, GPS jamming
and spoofing can only be achieved within a minimum of a few meters to a
maximum of over 100 miles. In practice, this puts critical infrastructures and
other assets in certain geographical locations in more danger than others.
Indeed, during World War II, the westernmost and northernmost industries in
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Germany and the southernmost and easternmost industries in England were
targeted significantly more than industries at opposite ends. This was based on
capable distances and payload capacities of aerial bombers. In hindsight, should
infrastructure managers and military planners consider proactively the
geographical locations of assets in relation to known military jamming
capabilities and likely end-users? Should GPS reliance be reduced and should
more investment into counter-jamming technologies be invested in these
locations?
There are, of course, predictable instances where jamming is a possibility. GPSreliant military systems such as UAVs used in conflict zones or near borders of
‘enemy’ states are vulnerable to jamming and spoofing. The interference of
civilian systems will likely be affected if within similar proximities of military
jammers. North Korea’s jamming in 2012, for example, was traced to the town
of Kaesong, just over the border.44 South Korea’s Incheon International Airport,
one of the busiest airports in the world, which serves the greater Seoul
metropolitan area, is only 23 miles from the demilitarized zone. The
metropolitan area of Seoul is approximately 60 miles from the demilitarized
zone. Counter-jamming technologies should therefore be refined to these areas
in practice. Governments of countries whose populations are likely to be
affected by electronic warfare methods will have sufficiently more pressure
weighed on them to take action.
Understanding a states’ strategic calculus of using electronic warfare as means
of harassment and intimidation over borders will also inform risk and
vulnerability assessments. Russia's Zapad military drills, involving thousands of
soldiers, are carried out as far as 10km from Norway.62 Finland have also
experienced jamming from Russian military exercises. This could be tied to
Norway’s hosting of NATO Exercise Trident Juncture 2018 and the latter’s
involvement. Only diplomatic approaches to persuade Russia to practice its
jamming capabilities out of reach of bordering infrastructures is the least
aggravating approach.
There is, however, the issue of complacency if vulnerability assessments are
confined to critical infrastructures near adjacent borders. There is always the
possibility that military jammers target locations from ships or aircraft or
smuggled into territories as parts and components and reassembled. The use of
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privacy seeking devices further complicates this matter. It is unrealistic for
critical infrastructure managers, particularly in dense urban locations (such as
the financial district of London) to create physical stand-off distances sufficient
to mitigate against interference.
Since the manufacture, trade and use of privacy seeking jammers has increased,
the geographical and geopolitical implications of critical infrastructure
protection have become more complex. Not only does jamming occur in conflict
zones and over territories, it already takes place in domestic locations. GPS
interference is, therefore, no longer confined to conflict zones or adjacent
territories, but prevails as an issue possible in all locations.

Conclusion
Since radio waves were utilized to relay information, so has the incentive of those
to disrupt that process. Since the introduction of GPS, jamming methods and
intentions have evolved at pace with developments in military technologies and
systems. Jamming has adapted from obstructing communications to affecting
target accuracy, surveillance capabilities, and navigational reliability. As an
offensive measure, it has been used almost entirely for harassment and
intimidation, affecting GPS-reliant systems in both military and civilian realms.
Overall, the practice of jamming has become potentially deadlier as reliance on
GPS has increased.
Whilst technical studies are extremely useful, they often do not explore the
geographical and geopolitical implications of jamming and spoofing in sufficient
depth. Based on the findings, it is unclear if jamming and disorientating smart
weapons by placing jammers on targeted buildings is effective, but Russia’s Pole21 initiative demonstrates that it is a mode of defense that is considered to this
day. For military strategists, precision bombings are simply more likely to be
successful in locations where jammers are not situated, hence the geographical
and geopolitical factors are influenced by strategic alliances, defense acquisitions,
end-user intentions, and owners of jammers.
States have targeted UAVs and military aircraft with some success in Ukraine,
Syria, and Afghanistan. North Korea and Russia are using electronic warfare
frequently as a mode of harassment into civilian areas. If jamming occurs in
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civilian areas for extended periods, this could place more pressure on countries to
respond with force (at the extreme end of the scale) but so far, such incidents
have been pursued diplomatically. Governments of countries whose populations
are likely to be affected by electronic warfare methods will have sufficiently more
pressure weighed on them to take action.
The impact of indiscriminate jamming of ships and planes has been largely
negligible, as they typically have backup navigation systems. But momentary
disruption has proven to be extremely hazardous in situations where collisions
could occur. Not only is this a threat to life but can provoke conflict. In the case of
Iran’s spoofing of the US UAV, the act of misdirecting aircraft or ships into
unauthorized airspaces and territories adds weight to the concern that spoofing
or momentary disorientation of positioning data could escalate tensions much
more than practice of indiscriminately jamming civilian areas, including ships
and aircraft.
The proliferation of small privacy seeking devices has grown considerably since
tracking, toll collection, gaming trends and other GPS-reliant systems have
emerged. Frequent interruptions to aircraft and the financial sector could be
further exploited by criminal, terrorists, proxy state actors in numerous ways.
GPS jamming is therefore no longer confined to conflict zones, it is a present
threat to domestic infrastructures.
Overall, the geographical position of a national territory and of its key
infrastructures in relation to likely end-users should influence the perception of a
countries’ defense needs.44 But this is further complicated by the fact that the
proliferation of jamming devices - which can be made at home or acquired
online, or projected from aircraft or ships - means that jamming ranges should
form only part of risk and vulnerability assessments.
There are, however, predictable instances where jamming is always a possibility:
In disputed territories, conflicts, and close to unfriendly borders. Likewise,
indiscriminate jammings in civilian areas may occur if military jamming is used
in self-defense in neighbouring countries. But military drills, like in Russia, which
could be practically undertaken away from adjacent territories, are intentionally
provocative. Overall, the vulnerability and proximity of infrastructure should be
considered in relation to the strategic intentions of neighbouring states.
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In the near future, military jamming will continue to be used as a form of
harassment in civilian areas, mostly in relatively short bursts that are less likely
to provoke an armed response. In distant future, as long as military systems rely
on GPS, electronic warfare will continue to be used in conflict to affect
communications, target accuracy, surveillance capabilities, and navigational
reliability. The success and efficiency of military operations will depend on the
enduring capability race between those involved in the research, development,
manufacture, trade in and use of jamming and counter-jamming technologies.
In order to develop our understanding of the possibilities and implications of
jamming, further research is required into the geographical implications of the
manufacture, trade in, and use of jamming devices as well as the possibilities of
their parts and components being smuggled and assembled in countries. More
research also is required into the socio-technical forces driving the demand for
different types of jammers, in particular the relationships between GPS reliance
and the forces that want to exploit that reliance.
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